Private Column by Frank Short, CBE
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Wednesday, 30 January 2013 12:00 AM

Policing a Clash of Cultures Part 10: The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Structure.

Excerpt from my memoirs.

We were supposed to have 999 personnel as the authorized number of working, trained, police officers. In fact we were closer to 750 due to natural wastage and the moratorium on recruitment mentioned previously.

The largest section was the National Reconnaissance and Surveillance Force (NRSF), a unit born from the old legacy of the Royal Solomon Islands police force being established as also the Islands defence force.

The Mamoloni Government had created the NRSF at the height of the Bougainville crisis transferring personnel from the Police Field Force and tasking them with responsibilities for border patrol, offshore surveillance, remote area policing and reinforcement of general duties police in large or serious operations.

The NRSF had been the most active in the northern Shortland Islands, located east of Papua New Guinea, where border incursions by Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNG) troops had caused several and serious Solomon Island casualties.

The members of the NRSF had very little training in general police duties; they were essentially, infantrymen: organized on military lines into platoons, wore military style camouflage uniforms, and issued with a range of standard type military issue weaponry.

They were, by virtue of their training and mindset – army. Here we need to understand what is a normal Law and Order establishment in many countries.

Internal security has three basic platforms:

· The first platform is the standard daily police operation; where close community relations with the populace are desired. Indeed essential.

· The second platform is the para military force; used only when there are disturbances beyond what the local police can handle. Or as patrol units where there are none or minimal standard police units. Then their duty is more of a PR type presence, supporting local chiefs and showing the government flag.

· The third platform is the army where large portions of the populace, for whatever reason are being disorderly on a large scale.

Here in the Solomon Islands we have an additional level added by the traditional village chiefs who can supplement police initial responses and provide warning of insurgency pressures. However that does not apply to heavily populated, multi ethnic, areas like Honiara.

People tend to misunderstand what para military really means and does. It is a step up from standard police work to where a police officer learns training in crowd control and the use of a long baton, shield and tear gas; operating from what the old European Vikings used to call ‘Skjaldborg,’ meaning shield wall.

This is an excellent method of the use of non lethal arms to deal with public order disturbances: especially in Islands where the people are by temperament, mainly good natured, and in general non violent and can stop small disturbances from escalating.


The alternative is to use military deployment in public order policing which could involve the use of firearms, because you cannot allow the ‘disturbance’ to close with you, as then your rifle becomes a rather unwieldy baton which can be taken from you and its contents used against you – a harmful and politically dangerous situation.

Do you really want to use a sledgehammer to swat a fly?

Or to generate such unnecessary public dislike for the uniform that the standard basic structure of Law and Order is affected on a daily working level?

There were hidden problems beyond the public eye involving logistics. The NRSF had military style rotational duties at the border. This meant that they had to re equip before any riot action.
A mindset adjustment was also needed as they had to think more ‘shield wall,’ rather than gun pointing.


I was not comfortable with this series of situations and it was why I created a Rapid Response Unit (RRU) that was hand picked, small, efficient and well trained for the specific job of policing small public order disturbances.

More on the RRU to follow in a later column.

A twist here was the fact that the NRSF operations were largely financed and supported, particularly in regard to training, by Australia – yet there it stopped…

It was also a reminder of how close Australia was physically, if not politically at that point in time.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, especially in the light of what was to occur within 18 months of my appointment. Now history…

The reports of a growing humanitarian crisis on Guadalcanal were there for all to see. Moreover, in the light of an intelligence report which I presented to Australian government representatives and briefings I gave to New Zealand government officials during the early months of 1999, it is my opinion the two regional governments could have helped to end the militancy and the intensifying humanitarian situation there and then, if only they had pondered less “the right to intervene” and considered more the “responsibility to protect.”

The attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the first Bali bombing in October 2002, in which 88 Australians tragically lost their lives, changed our neighbours' strategic thinking, but much more of the issue involving 'intervention' and a renewed approach to it, particularly by Australia, will follow in later chapters.

I was hired for my knowledge of policing and police experience but neither regional power seemed to want to pay attention to what I had to say, which was: to correctly forecast what would happen from the unfolding crisis.

Regrettably, while Australia declined to intervene, the nation shook: the unrest led to the consequential political, social and economic collapse of the Solomon Islands, to say nothing of the tragic loss of life on both sides of the ethnic conflict.

This is not sour grapes on my part, simply born out by later events that had been accurately predicted and timelessly reported to both regional governments.

The next largest component of the force was the uniformed branch. However, due to the structural size and geography of the Islands together with the diversity of the population centers, de-centralization had always been an unfortunate necessity; with the result that the majority were localized around the main centre of Honiara and others were posted throughout the provincial territories.

Our specialized units like the Criminal Investigation Department, (CID) and the Special Branch (SB) had main offices in Rove, Honiara. Some plain clothes officers from both branches were also posted throughout the islands.

We also had about forty women police officers, who were mainly employed on administrative duties, including handling the essential communications equipment. They operated out of the Headquarters office building and Honiara Central Police Station.

There was also a small Marine Unit which was responsible for manning the Australian donated patrol boats. Here there was a problem. They considered themselves an elite unit that objected to being seen as marine police officers, serving together with the NRSF, but preferring to retain their more traditional naval insignia. Pride in one’s unit is fine – to a degree. However, the bottom line was they were police officers first and sailors second.

We were also responsible for the Fire Brigade in Honiara and Auki. This also extended to Henderson Field where we had some forty officers and firemen, doing both duties.

We had a small Civilian Volunteer police force at the time, known as Special Constables, who assisted occasionally with operational duties, usually when special events occurred such as major football matches, Queen’s Birthday Parade, or the Anniversary Parade marking Independence Day each year. Their initial numbers were small and their police training and experience was minimal.

To be continued ………



Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of Frank Short, CBE and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Solomon Times Online.

This post is part of a series. Next post: Policing a Clash of Cultures Part 11: The Command Structure